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WILLS -APPLICATION OF FLORIDA ANTILAPSE
STATUTE TO CLASS GIFTS
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory decree construing a clause of a will
devising all the residue of the testatrix's property to a class, her brothers
and sisters, to share and share alike. Three of the class had died prior to
the execution of the will and two of the class had died subsequent to
the execution of the will but prior to the death of the testatrix. The
plaintiffs, lineal descendants of the deceascd class members, sought to take
the deceased class members' share by virtue of the Florida antilapse
statute. Held, the antilapse statute prevented the failure of the class gift
only as to those members of the class alive at the time of the will's
execution but who predeceased the testatrix; those class members deceased
prior to the will's execution were not members of the class described in
tht will. Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473 (Fla. App. 1959).
At common law it was a familiar rule that a testamentary gift to a
named beneficiary lapsed upon the death of the beneficiary in the lifetime
of the testator;' further, a gift to a named beneficiary who was dead at
the time the will was executed was void and of no force and effect.2
An antilapse statute3 is designed to abrogate either one or both of these
common law rules depending upon the wording and judicial construction of
the statute. It allows the surviving lineal descendants of the deceased
beneficiaries who bore the requisite familial relationship to the testator4
to take the share of those beneficiaries absent a contrary intent expressed
in the will.5 For example, the Florida antilapse statute provides:
But when any property is devised or bequeathed to an adopted
child or blood kindred of the testator, and when such devisee or
legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, or is
dead at the time the will is executed, leaving lineal descendants
who survive the testator, such legacy or devise does not lapse .. .
The problem posed by the instant case is whether the Florida statute
will operate to prevent a failure of the devise notwithstanding the fact
1. Williams v. Williams, 152 Fla. 255, 9 So.2d 798 (1942); Sorrels v. McNally,
89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925); 1 REDFEARN, \Vi.s & AhiNIS'ISRATION OF ESTATES
IN FI.ORIDA § 149 (3d ed. 1957); 96 CI.S. Wills § 1201, at 1041 (1957).
2. Dean v. Crews, 77 Fla. 319, 81 So. 479 (1919); 1 REDFEARN, op. cif. suora
note I § 149; 96 C.I.S. Wills § 1201, at 1043 (1957).
3. Evidently all but three states - Louisiana, New Mexico and Wyoming - have
some type of autilapse provision.
4. '[There is no uniform wording in the antilapse statutes describing the relationship
of the claimants to the testator necessary in order to fall within the purview of the
statute. Nor is there any uniformity in the judicial construction of the descriptive terms
in these statutes pertaining to the extent of coverage. The most common words are,
"child or other relative." Califomia and Vermont use the word, "kindred" and
Minnesota, "blood relation."
5. The antilapse statute has vitality only in the absence of any intent expressed
in the will. Such intent will be given efficacy regardless of the operation of the antilapse
statute. See generally Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1172 (1959).
6. FLA..STAT. § 731.20 (1957).
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that the gift was to a designated class rather than to a named beneficiary:'
I) where the class member was alive at the execution of the will but pre-
deceased the testatrix; 2) where the class member died prior to the time
of the will's execution.
At common law a gift to a class was legally incapable of lapsing so
long as one member of the class survived the testator.8 Only those class
members alive at the death of the testator, the time at which the class
was fixed, were members of the designated sharing class.9 Thus, the word
lapse as used at common law had reference only to gifts to named bene-
ficiaries.t 0 It is not surprising to find that the English courts in construing
the English Statute of Wills of 1837, 1 which was the first to incorporate
antilapse provisions, strictly construed the statute' 2 to prevent only what
would have been a common law lapse. Consequently, the statute would
not be applicable to class gifts.' 3
A minority of the American courts in the first situation, i.e. where the
class member was alive at the time of the will's execution but predeceased
the testator, follow this strict English construction and hold the antilapse
statute inapplicable to class gifts.' 4
On the other hand, the majority of American courts, sacrificing technical
consistency for liberality, have adopted a more modem approach and have
held the statute applicable to class gifts as well as to named beneficiaries.
7. Five states -Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Tennessee-
have antilapse statutes expressly applicable to class gifts. See MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 93 § 355 (1957).
8. Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So. 400 (1930); Dean v. Crews, 77 Fla.
319, 81 So. 479 (1919); 57 AM. JTR. Wilts § 1426, at 957 (1948).
9. [At common law] "a gift to a class is a gift of an aggregate sum to a body
of persons, uncertain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future
time, and who are all to take in equal or in some other definite proportions, the share
of each being dependent for its amount upon the ultimate number." 3 PAcE, WILLS
§ 1046, at 196 (Lifetime ed. 1941).
10. It can be argued that where all class members predecease the testator the gift
has lapsed. Nevertheless the English courts when faced with this situation have held the
antilapse statute, which had been construed as preventing common law lapse, inapplicable
to class gifts. In re Harvey's Estate, [18931, 1 Ch. 567.
1I. Wills Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4 & I Vict., c. 26 § 33.
12. The antilapse statute provided:[That where any person being a child or other issue of the testator to
whom any real or personal estate shall be devised or bequeathed for any
estate or interest not determinable at or before the death of such person
shall die in the lifetime of the testator leaving issue, and any such issue
of such person shall be living at the time of the death of the testator,
such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death
of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator,
unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will.
13. In re Harvey's Estate, [18931 1 Ch. 567; Olney v. Bates, 3 Drew 319,
61 Eng. Rep.-925 (Ch. 1855).
14. Ga.: Toucher v. Hawkins, 158 Ga. 482, 123 S.E. 618 (1924); Iowa: Friederichs
v. Friederichs, 205 Iowa 505, 218 N.. 271 (1928); Neb.: Lacy v. Murdock, 147 Neb.
242, 22 N.V.2d 713 (1946); N.H.: Campbell v. Clark, 64 N.1l. 328, 10 Atd. 702
(1887); N.J.: In re Force's Estate, 23 N.J. Misc. 141, 42 A.2d 302 (Orphans' Ct.
1945) (by implication); N.Y.: In re Guering's Estate, 206 Misc. 850, 133 N.Y.S.2d
253 (Surr. Ct. 1954) (Earlier cases contra were overruled).
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The rationale of these courts can be divided [roughly] into the purpose
and intent approaches.15
The courts which follow the intent approach hold that the antilapse
statute was designed by the legislature to give efficacy to the testator's
probable intent, viz., that all class menbers alive at the will's execution
should share in his estate. 0 rhe courts which follow the purpose approach
reason that the statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally
construed to give efficacy to its purpose, viz., rectifying the inequality
of the distribution of the testator's property among the objects of his
affection resulting from the common law rule of allowing only those
beneficiaries alive at the death of the testator to share in his estate. 7
In the second situation, i.e., where the class menber was deceased
prior to the will's execution, the courts are faced with the additional
argument that at common law a gift to a deceased beneficiary was void
and, thus, such a beneficiary was never a member of the described class.' 8
The only courts which hold the statute applicable in this second situation
are those courts which follow the extremely liberal purpose approach."0
rhis minority reasons that if the testator's estate is to be equitably
distributed the date of death of a class member must not be determinative. 2
15. See, 3 PACE, op. Cit. supra note 9, at § 1062; Casner, Class Gifts-Effect of
Failure of Class Menber to Survive the Testator, 60 IIARv. L. REv. 751 (1946);
Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 848 (1957).
16. Cal.: In re Steidl's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948); Ky.:
Barnhill v. Sharon, 135 Ky. 70, 121 S.W. 983 (1909) (by virtue of the express
terms of the Kentucky statute); Me.: Moses v. Allen, 81 Me. 268, 17 Atl. 66 (1889);
Mass.: Galloupe v. Blake, 248 Mass. 196, 142 N.E. 818 (1924); Mo.: Stolle v. Stolle,
66 S.V.2d 912 (Mo. 1933) (dictum); Zombro v. Moffett, 329 Mo. 137, 44 S.W.2d
149 (1931); Pa.: In re Harrison's Estate, 202 Pa, 331, 51 At!. 976 (1902) (dictum);
In re laupt's Estate, 57 Pa. 1). & C. 416, 30 Northampton County Rep. 261 (Orphans'
Ct. 1946) (cases decided under an express statutory provision); R.I.: Winsor v. Brown,
48 R.I 200, 136 Atl. 434 (1927) (dictum); Moore v. Dimond, 5 R.I. 121 (1858);
Tex.: Burch v. McMillin, 15 S.WV.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Wash.: In re Hutton's
Estate, 106 Vash. 578, 180 Pac. 882 (1919) (dictum). For a complete collection of
cases, see Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957), Armot., 3 A.L.R. 1673 (1919).
17. Conn.: Clifford v. Cronin, 97 Conn. 434, 117 Atl. 489 (1922); Del.: Todd v.
Gambrill, 15 Del. Ch. 342, 138 Atl. 167 (1927); Ill.: Kehl v. Taylor, 275 111. 346, 114
N.E. 125 (1916); Mich.: Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891).(Dictum in the case leads one to believe that although following purpose rationale, court
will look to the intent); Minn.: In re Kittson's Estate, 177 Minn. 469, 225 NAW. 439(1929); Ohio: Wooley v. Paxson, 46 Ohio St. 307, 24 N.E. 599 (1888); S.D.: Iloverstad
v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 76 S.D. 119. 74 N.W.2d 48, 56 A.L.R. 938 (1955);
l'or a complete collection of cases, see Anot., 56 A.L.R.2d 948 (1957); Annot., 3 A.L.R,
1673 (1919). For a rationale which best represents this view, see Kehl v. Taylor, supra.
18. See note 2 supra.
19. Conn.: Ackerman v. lughes, 11 Conn. Supp. 133 (Super. Ct., Fairfield County
1942); Del.: Todd v. Gambrill, 15 Del. Ch. 342, 138 Atl. 176 (1927); Ill.: Kehl v.
Taylor, 275 Ill. 346, 114 N.E. 125 (1916); Ky.: Abney v. Pearson, 225 Ky. 394, 74
S.WX.2d 465 (1934), (by virtue of express statutory terms); Minn., In re Kittson's Estate,
177 Nlinn. 469, 225 N.W. 439 (1929); Ohio.: Shurnaker v. Pearson, 67 Ohio 330, 65
N.A. 1005 (1902); S.D.: Hoversted v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co,, 76 S.1). 119,
74 N.V.2d 48, 56 A.L.R.2d 938 (1955); A Maine court, following an intent approach,
has held the statute applicable after finding that the testator intended the statute to
apply. Bray v. Pullen, 84 Me. 185, 24 Atl. 811 (1892).
20. Casner, supra note 15, at 762, indicates that in order to promote the statute's
purpose the time of death of a person, otherwise a class member, should not be important.
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The great weight of authority is against applying the statute to
class gifts where the class member was deceased prior to the execution of
the will. This majority is composed of: 1) those courts which adopt the
strict English construction of the antilapse statute and refuse to apply
the statute to any class gifts;2 1 2) those courts which follow the common
law rule that a gift to an already deceased beneficiary is void, reasoning
that a statute preventing lapse can not prevent a gift from being void;22
3) those courts which follow the intent approach and hold that the testator
could not have intended persons deceased at the time of the execution
of the will to share as class members.23
The court in the instant case was presented for the first time with the
question of the applicability of the Florida antilapse statute to class gifts.
The court divided the question into two parts: 1 ) as to the lineal descendants
of the class members alive at the time of the execution of the will but
who precdeceased the testatrix; 2) as to the lineal descendants of the class
members deceased prior to the will's execution. In the former situation, the
court recognized the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed.24 Nevertheless, the court construed the legisla-
tive use of the words "blood kindred" in the statute to mean blood relatives
in the plural, thus manifesting a clear legislative intent to apply the
statute to class gifts. "5 As a result, the lineal descendants of those deceased
class members who were alive at the time of the will's execution will
now take that share the class member would have taken had he survived. 8
As to the situation where the class inember was deceased prior to the
will's execution, the court recognized once again the rule that the antilapse
statute is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed. 7
In this situation the court expressly followed an intent approach,28 reasoning
that when a testator provides for his brothers and sisters he normally
intends to include only his then living brothers and sisters.29 To allow
the statute to operate in this situation would defeat the probable intent
of the testator. Accordingly, the statute was held inapplicable and the
21. See note 14 supra.
22. Mass.: Morse v. Mason, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 36 (1865); Mont.: Hash v. Hash
64 Mont. 118, 208 Pac. 605 (1922); Pa.: In re Haupt's Estate, 57 Pa. D. & C. 416,
30 Northampton County Rep. 261 (Orphans' Ct. 1946) (in spite of a statutory provision).
23. Cal.: In re Steidl's Estate, 89 Cal. App.2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948) (dictum
and by implication); Me.: Bray v. Pullen, 84 Me. 185, 24 Atl. 811 (1892); Mich.:
Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891) (by implication); Mo.: Stolle v.
Stolle, 66 S.XV.2d 912 (Mo. 1933) (A gift to a class creates an ambiguity which has to
be resolved by ascertaining what the testator intended); R.L-: Winsor v. Brown, 48 R.I.
200, 136 Atl. 434 (1927) (by implication); Tex.: Burch v. Me, illin, 15 S.W.2d 86
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) (by implication); Wash.: In re Hutton's Estate, 106 Wash.
578, 180 Pac. 882 (1919) (by implication'.
24. Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla. App. 1959).
25. ibid.
26. Id. at 476.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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lineal descendants of the class menibcr deceased at the time of the will's
execution were not to be included in the sharing class.
The dissent in the instant case would follow the strict English con-
struction that the antilapse statute is designed solely to prevent common
law lapse. Since a class gift at common law did not present such a lapse
situation, the antilapse statute is inapplicable to all class gifts.30 The
dissenting judge indicated that if the legislature really intended the anti-
lapse statute to apply to class gifts, such intention easily could have been
effectuated by inserting in the statute one or two additional words which
would have eliminated any doubt as to its purpose or meaning."'
As a general proposition, the application of the statute to class gifts
appears to be a proper result. If the aiitilapsc statutes arc designed to prevent
a failure of testamentary gifts, should the result be any different if the
testator specifically names his beneficiaries or generally names them through
a class designation?
Although the Florida decision is consonant with the majority viewpoint
in both fact situations presented, an analysis of the statute indicates that
the instant problem may necessitate another pronouncement before it is
finally settled, in reaching the majority rule as to class members alive at
the execution of the will but who predeceased the testatrix, the court
hinged its decision upon the interpretation of the unique words 3 "blood
kindred" in the Florida statute as meaning a class. However, in arriving
at the conclusion that the antilapsc statute was not applicable to gifts
to class members deceased prior to the execution of the will, the court did
not appear to notice the uncommon3 4 wording of the statute to the effect
that when ". . . such devisee or legatee dies before the testator ... or is dead
at the time the will is executed ...such legacy or devise does not lapse."
(Emphasis added.) 3 5
From a plain reading of the statute, if blood kindred means class,
and the court says it does, then the statute should logically operate to
prevent the failure of testamentary gifts to class members in both fact
situations.3
30. Id. at 477.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. See note 4 suora.
34. It appears that of the states which do not have express provisions applicable to
a class, only six states besides Florida-California, Georgia, South Dakota, Utah, and
\Vest Virginia-have the additional proviso in their statutes to the effect, "or is dead
at the time the will is executed."
35. FLA. STAT. § 731.20 (1957).
36. Of the six states in note 34 su/ra: Georgia follows the strict English view and
will not prevent failure of the testamentary gift even to a named beneficiary who is dead
prior to the will's execution; Utah and West Virginia have no cases interpreting the
provision; Ohio and South Dakota follow the purpose approach and hold the statute
applicable in both situations; California follows the intent approach that has not had
the problem presented squarely before it; however, by implication in In re Steidl's Estate,
89 Cal. App.2d 488, 201 P.2d 58 (1948) it would appear that the statute will be
inapplicable to class gifts if the class membex was dead prior to the execution of the will.
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Unless the court used the interpretation of the words "blood kindred"
as merely lending credence to an implied holding that the legislature
intended the statute to apply only if the result would approximate the
testator's probable intent,3 7 the decision appears open to attack by lineal
descendants of class members who were deceased prior to the will's
execution. They may logically point out the inconsistency of relying upon
the words of the statute in one situation, yet adopting an intent approach
in the second situation and ignoring the words of the statute, ". .. or is
dead prior to the will's execution. '38
MARTIN J. NASH
37. This appears to be a reasonable inference to draw based upon the court's opinion
in the instant case where it states:
Such holding (speaking of the applicability of the statute to class gifts
where the class member was alive at the execution of the will but pre-
deceased the testator) is justified on the premise that a lapse of a
testamentary gift is thereby prevented and the gift will pass to those
wham the testator would most likely have wished to be substituted for
the deceased member of the class. Drafts v. Drafts, 114 So.2d 473,
475 (Fla. App. 1959).
38. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 298 (1940) takes the view that the statute
should be applied as to class members who die prior to the execution of the will only
if: "A) the testator is found to have intended to include the already deceased possible
taker as a member of the class in favor of which he made the limitation." (Florida will
apparently follow this reasoning which requires an affirmative intent ol the part of the
testator); "B) or the statute, in terms applies to a devisee 'who dies before that will is
executed' (as the Florida statute provides) and no contrary intent of the testator is found
from additional language or circumstances." (Emphasis added.)
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